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THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . LVII
Public policy is truly an unruly horse' and even the most adept and
experienced cannot ride it without some feeling for the dangers
involved . One problem is that the rider may become saddle-sore and
develop such a thick skin that he becomes insensitive to subtle and
important changes in the applicability of prevailing policy considera-
tions . Also, public policy is likely to carry the unwary off in
directions that the rider did not anticipate or desire . An area of
Anglo-Canadian law whose development has been strikingly domi-
nated by the dictates of public policy is that of the possible immunity
of the lawyer from actions for negligence in respect of the conduct of
litigation . Unfortunately, the courts have proved poor horsemen in
this respect . Not only are the recent developments in English law to
be deplored, but any attempt to establish an immunity of any extent
in Canada is to be strenuously resisted . 2
For over a century, it had been accepted that in English law, a
barrister was "not responsible for any mistake or indiscretion or
error of judgment of any sort" .' However, in 1964, with the
introduction of liability for negligent statements by the House of
Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller and Partners 4 the
continued existence of such an immunity became questionable .
Three years later in 1967 in Rondel v. Worsley, s the House of Lords
put such doubts to rest . Upholding the decision of Lawton J . at first
instance' and the Court of Appeal,' it decided unanimously that a
barrister was entitled to some immunity from actions in respect of
professional negligence, specifically those arising from the conduct
of proceedings in court although they could not agree upon the extent
of such an immunity.' Ignoring the customary rationale of the
'Richardson v . Mellish (1824), 2 Bing . 252, per Burrough J .
z Although Mr . Catzman gives no express indication of his particular stance on
the issue, the general tenor of his comment is that, while the recent limiting of the
scope of the immunity by the House of Lords is to be applauded, some immunity is
appropriate . Furthermore, in an earlier comment, he stated : "It will not have escaped
the reader's attention that substantially all of the considerations of public interest
which the members of the House of Lords found so compelling are equally
appropriate to the realities ofCanadian litigation . In the writer's view, therefore, it is
not unlikely that when a Canadian Rondel and a Canadian Worsley have the mutual
misfortune to combine, our courts may well extend the immunity from action which
the House of Lords saw fit to bestow upon Worsley to his hapless Canadian
counterpart ." See (1968), 46 Can . Bar Rev. 505, at p . 515 .
ISwinfen v . Lord Chelmsford (1860), 5 H . & N . 890, at p . 924, per Pollock
C.B .
4 [19641 A.C . 465, [196312 All E.R . 575 .
s [19691 1 A .C . 191, [196713 All E .R . 993 .
s [19671 1 Q .B . 499, [196613 All E .R . 660 .
' (19671 1- Q .13 . 443, [19661 1 All E.R . 467 .
$ In brief, Lord Reid and Lord Morris believed that the immunity should only




barrister's inability to sue for his fees,' the House chose to base such
immunity on overriding considerations of public policy . In short, it
concluded that "the claim of an individual to a remedy for injustice
suffered is held to be prejudicial to the sound administration of
justice and, being a matter of overriding public interest, must
prevail" ." Disregarding their own warning that public policy is "a
very unstable and dangerous foundation on which to build"," they
relied upon three broad grounds of public interest :
(a) A barrister owes a duty to the court which must be carried out
fearlessly and independently . It is superior to any duty he may
owe his client .
(b) An action for negligence against a barrister would involve a
re-trial of the original case which would only serve to increase
and prolong litigation .
(c) A barrister is under an obligation to accept any client, however
difficult or undesirable who seeks his services .
Almost a decade later, in 1978, in SaifAli v. Sydney Mitchell &
Co. 11 the House of Lords were asked to rule on the extent of such an
immunity ; that is, "what is the extent of a barrister's immunity, if
any, against a claim for damages for negligence in the performance
of his professional duties out of court?" 13 All five law lords were of
the firm opinion, although for slightly differing reasons, that the
decision in Rondel v . Worsley 14 was conclusive on the question of
the existence of an immunity and that the purpose of the present case
was simply to provide "a fringe decision rather than a new
pattern" . 15 By a slender majority, the House decided not to sanction
felt that the immunity of counsel should start at that letter before action where
taxation of party and party costs start ; Lord Pearson expressed doubt as to whether
there would be immunity for doing "pure paper work"; and Lord Pearce believed
that the immunity did not extend to pure paper work but did cover workcarried out in
chambers . On balance, it would seem that their lordships were not in favour of a
blanket immunity .
9Re Le Brasseur and Oakley, [189612 Ch . 487; Kennedy v. Brown (1803), 13
C .B .N .S . 677; Wells v . Wells, [1914] P . 157.
to M.A . Millner, Negligence in Modern Law (1967), p. 55 . See also, John G.
Fleming, The Law of Torts (5th ed., 1977), pp . 138-139.
uJanson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, [1902] A.C . 484, at p. 507, per
Lord Linley .
12 [1978] 3 All E.R . 1033, rev'ing [1978] Q.B . 95, [1977] 3 All E.R . 744
(C . A.) . Anumber of actions were brought against barristers since 1967 but they were
all settled out ofcourt ; see Q. Edwards, The Saif Ali case : a new liability for the Bar?
Guardian Gazette, 29th Nov, 1978, p. 1185 .
"Ibid., at p. 1046, per Lord Jalmon .
x' Supra, footnote 5.
11 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 1037, per Lord Wilberforce .
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a blanket immunity and imposed a limit on the extent of such
immunity . While the minority felt that, if there was a public policy
basis to ground any immunity, that immunity should extend to all
work done in every aspect of the civil litigation process, is the
majority maintained that these policy considerations lose much of
their relevancy and cogency when "the scene of the exercise of the
barrister's judgment . . . is shifted from the hurly-burly of the trial
to the relative tranquility of the barrister's chambers" . t' The
majority adopted the test laid down by McCarthy P . in the New
Zealand case of Rees v . Sinclair : is
The protection exists only where the particular work is so intimately connected
with the conduct of the cause in court that it can fairly be said to be a
preliminary decision affecting the way the cause is to be conducted when it
comes to hearing .
Do the policy considerations that the English courts feel warrant
the continued existence of an immunity, albeit limited to the conduct
of litigation, have any relevance to the Canadian predicament and, in
particular, should such an immunity be established in Canadian law?
Such questions are no longer merely academic for in the recent case
ofDemarco v. Ungaro and Barycky, is the Supreme Court of Ontario
was faced with such a problem . In reaching his decision, Mr. Justice
Krever did not duck any of the important policy matters raised, but,
with admirable judicial fortitude and perspicacity, met the issues
squarely and carne to a commendable decision that left no doubt as to
the stance he had taken .
The facts alleged by the plaintiff were quite straightforward . In
July 1975, an action was brought against the plaintiff in the present
case, Mark Demarco, for an unpaid debt of $6,000 .00 . He retained
the services of the defendants, Guy Ungaro and George Barycky,
who were partners in a Niagara Falls law practice . The plaintiff lost
his action and had costs awarded against him . In September 1978,
is Although the opinions of Lord Russell and Lord Keith are likely to be
ignored, they both make a couple of points worth repeating . For instance, Lord
Russell remarks that, "there may be much to be said for denying immunity from
claims for negligence by a barrister in the conduct of civil litigation in court . But
while that immunity stands, as I think it does as involved in the decision of this
House in Rondel v . IYorsley, I see no escape from the extension to pre-trial alleged
negligence so strongly supported (obiter) in that case ;" ibid ., at p . 1054 .
17 Ibid . . at p . 1043, per Lord Diplock .
18 [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R . 180, at p . 187 (C.A .) . In the recent case of Biggar v .
McLeod, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R . 9, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the
settlement of an action by compromise in court was work related to the conduct of
litigation and, as such, was covered by the immunity of the barrister. It should be
noted that the New Zealand legal profession is a hybrid of the English and Canadian
professions . Certain lawyers can act as both barristers and solicitors whereas others
are barristers alone and cannot act as solicitors .




the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants alleging
that the earlier action had been lost due to the negligence of the
defendants . In a catalogue of unfortunate events ,2° the plaintiff's
central claim was that the second defendant had failed to lead
evidence which he knew was available and which would have
supported the plaintiff's position . The defendants brought a motion
to strike out that part of the plaintiff's statement of claim for
disclosing no cause of action and for being frivolous and vexatious. 21
With the agreement of the plaintiff and with the leave of the court, an
order was made to hear the point of law involved." In bringing this
motion, the defendants relied upon the principles and rationale
adopted by the House of Lords in Rondel v . Worsley 23 and submitted
that such a decision was good law in Ontario . The question for the
court, therefore, was, in the words of Krever J ., quite blunt:
All that is involved is whether, a dissatisfied client is without any right to sue
his or her lawyer. Put another way, the question is whether a lawyer, in the
conduct of a trial, or other proceeding in court, is, alone among all other
professional persons, incapable of being sued by the client for negligence . 24
A brief glance at the case law in Ontario regarding the possible
immunity of an advocate shows that such a suggestion has received a
decidedly cool reception. As early, as 1863, the Court of Queen's
Bench in the Upper Canada case of Leslie v. Ball,25on very similar
facts to the Demarco case, was of the opinion that little could be
gained from following English authority, since the fusion of the legal
profession in Upper Canada resulted in there being policy considera-
tions of a different character at work . This distinction was further
articulated a couple of decades later in R . v. Doutre 2' by Lord
Watson who entertained serious doubts whether:
[i)n an English colony where the common law of England is in force,
[considerations of public policy) could have any applicability to the case of a
lawyer who is not a mere advocate or pleader, and who combines in his own
person the various functions which are exercised by legal practitioners ofevery
26 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants did not assist or confer with him in
preparation for the examinations for discovery or the trial ; that the defendants failed
to proceed expeditiously with the defence and caused him unnecessary expense; and
that the first defendant failed to appear at trial and sent the second defendant whowas
totally unprepared . The defendants conceded that such allegations revealed a proper
cause of action .
21 Rule 126 (Out .) .
22 Rule 124 (Out .) .
23 Supra, footnote 5 .
24 Supra, footnote 19, at p. 675 .
Zs (1863), 22 U.C.Q .B . 512 (Q .B .) . See also, McDougall v. Campbell (1877),
41 U.C .Q .B . 332 (Q .B .) ; Wade v. Ball (1870), 20 U.C.C .P . 302 (C.P .) ;
Robertson v. Furness (1879), 43 U.C .Q.B . 143 (Q .B .) .
26 [18841 A.C . 745 (P.C .) .
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class in England, all of whom, the Bar alone excepted, can recover their fees by
an action at law,
Until the decision in Rondel v. Worsley," the question of a
possible immunity did not come before the Canadian courts 29 and,
therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that no such immunity
existed . Indeed, even after the decision in Rondel v . Worsley," it
seemed agreed on most sides that the policy considerations that
supported the continued existence of the immunity in England were
"not germane to the Canadian milieu"" and that the decision should
be ignored . For instance, Laskin J .A., as he then was, speaking in a
personal capacity, was unequivocal :
The rules of conduct that in England govern the relations between barristers
and solicitors have no meaning in Canada . Lawyers here are generally both
barristers and solicitors, and certainly belong to the same Law Society . It was
possible in Ontario until 1964 to be admitted as a solicitor without being called
to the Bar; since that date the rules oftheLaw Society of Upper Canada provide
for admission in both capacities or not at all . In sum Rondel v . Worsley is based
on considerations which have no Canadian relevance ."
Such resolve and certainty were given a firm jolt by the decision
of the Ontario High Court in Banks v. Reid. 32 Involving a failure to
amend pleadings within the stipulated limitation period, Henry J .
indicated that had he been called to do so, he would "have dismissed
the action on the principle confirmed by the House of Lords in
Rondel v . Worsley" . 33 The Court of Appeal, although deciding the
matter on other grounds, took time to comment on the trial judge's
dictum . Delivering the judgment of the court, Brooke J.A . said that
"[i]f [an immunity] is applicable at all in this jurisdiction where
practitioners are both barristers and solicitors, Rondel v . Worsley
should be confined to issues between a barrister and his client in the
discharge of the barrister's duties before a Court and is dependent
upon consideration of the barrister's duty to the Court and duty to his
"Supra, footnote 5 .
2e In the few reported cases concerning a lawyer's negligence that came before
the courts, there was no discussion ofthe existence of any immunity ; see Hett v . Pun
Pong (1891), 18 S .C.R . 290 ; Simpson v . S.G .1 .0 . (1967), 61 W.W.R . 741 (Sask .
C .A .) ; Page v . Solicitor (1971), 20 D .L.R . (3d) 532 (N.B .S.C .), aff'd . without
reasons, (1974), 29 D.L.R . (3d) 386 (S.C.C .) .
"Supra, footnote 5 .
30 Jeremy A . Nightingale, The Negligent Practice of Law in Canada: A
Chronicle of Client Frustration (1976), 40 Sask . L . Rev . 47, at p . 50 .
31 The British Tradition in Canadian Law (1969), p . 26 . See also, T.G . Bastedo,
A Note on Lawyer's Malpractice ; Legal Boundaries and Regulations (1969), 7
O.H.L .J . 311, at p . 312; G.A . Martin, The Role and Responsibility of the Defence
Advocate (1970), 12 Crim . L.Q . 376 ; and A . Linden, Canadian Tort Law (1977), pp .
111-112 . But, contra, M . Catzman, comment (1968), 46 Can . Bar Rev, 505 .
32 (l975), 6 O.R . (2d) 404, 53 D.L.R . (3d) 27 .




client" . 34 Consequently, prior to the decision in the Demarco case,
the question of whether a lawyer canbe held liable for his conduct in
court had been resurrected and become a matter of genuine concern
for the legal profession and public alike.
This problem of lawyer's malpractice is of especial concern to
the public at large for it puts into doubt the very efficiency and
quality of the legal process: factors which are of critical importance
in fostering and retaining the requisite degree of respect for the law
and the legal system . 35 Nevertheless, whatever rigorous standards or
elaborate safeguards are maintained by the legal system, it would be
naive and unrealistic to claim that there are no faultless lawyers and
that all advocates are masters of their craft. The fact that most clients
place themselves entirely within the control and discretion of their
lawyer is to be weighed heavily in deciding on the course and
measures to be taken when there is an occasional and inevitable
breakdown in that relationship . In short, the continued integrity and
well-being of the legal system demands that such instances be dealt
with not by submerging them beneath a unique professional
immunity and, in some way, pretending they do not exist, but by
bringing them into the open and treating them in accordance with the
procedures and standards designed to meet other types of profes-
sional negligence.
In the Demarco case, Mr. Justice Krever was clearly of the
opinion that the immunity of a lawyer from action for negligence at
the suit of his client by reason of the conduct of acase in court has no
place in the law of Ontario:
It has not been, is not now, and should not be, public policy in Ontario to
confer exclusively on lawyers engaged in court work an immunity possessed by
no other professional person . Public policy and the public interest do not exist
in a vacuum . They must be examined against the background of a host of
sociological facts of the society concerned. Nor are they lawyers' values as
34 (1978), 18 O.R . (2d) 148, at p. 153, 81 D .L .R . (3d) 730, at p. 735. See also
Gouzenko v. Harris et al . (1976), 13 O.R . (2d) 730, at p. 751, 72 D.L.R . (3d) 293,
at p. 314, per Goodman J.
3s Lord Evershed M.R . stated, in Kitchen v. R .A .F . Association, [195812 All
E.R . 241, at p. 245, that "an action against a [lawyer] for alleged negligence . . . is
always a matter of special anxiety to the court: for to some extent, inevitably, our
system and profession of law is impugned and its adequacy and competence
challenged" . Also, "Legal malpractice differs significantly from other torts,
however, in its particularly close relationship to the functioning of the legal system .
Lawyers' negligence constitutes a malfunction of the system through which society
seeks to enforce its definition ofjustice . When an attorney's negligence deprives his
client of property or rights to which he would otherwise be entitled under the
applicable law, damage is done not only to that person but also to the societal
objectives embodied in the substantive rule and to the capacity of the legal system as
a dispute-solving mechanism.", Improving Information on Legal Malpractice
(1973), 82 Yale L.J . 590, at pp . 591-592.
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opposed to the values shared by the rest of the community. In the light of recent
developments in the law of professional negligence and the rising incidence of
"malpractice" actions against physicians (and especially surgeons who may be
thought to be to physicians what barristers are to solicitors), I do not believe
that enlightened, non-legally trained members of the community would agree
with me if I were to hold that the public interest requires that litigation lawyers
be immune from actions for negligence . I emphasize again that I am not
concerned with the question whether the conduct complained about amounts to
negligence . Indeed, I find it difficult to believe that a decision made by a
lawyer in the conduct of a case will be held to be negligence as opposed to a
mere error of judgment . But there may be cases in which the error is so
egregious that a court will conclude that it is negligence ."
Although Mr . Justice Krever did not comment at any great
length on the policy considerations considered by English courts to
be supportive of an immunity, there are at least six grounds on which
those considerations can be challenged . In the first place, although
the demands of justice and its efficient administration are of
paramount importance, the advocate is in an entirely different
position to other participants in the judicial process, such as the
judge, jury and witnesses who are in general, immune from civil
suit . 31 He holds himself out as a professional man and is engaged by
his client on the basis of his ability to conduct litigation with special
skill, knowledge and experience . Furthermore, he accepts remunera-
tion precisely on those terms . Accordingly, he should be treated in
the same manner as other professionals and owe a similar duty of
care to his clients . This "in no way seems inconsistent with him
holding certain other privileges and immunities qua participant in the
judicial process" . 38
Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that the disastrous
consequences anticipated by certain judges and commentators,
namely, "a proliferation of disputes between accusing clients and
accused barristers", 39 would flow from the suspension of the
immunity . The fear of a deluge of negligence actions is a groundless
one and it is pure hyperbole to talk of the advocate being haunted by
the daunting spectre of impending litigation . 10 As Krever J . noted,
3B Supra, footnote 19, at p. 693.
37 Such participants are immune from civil actions in respect of words spoken or
acts done in the course of judicial proceedings . However, as Krever J . noted, "The
privilege, a fundamental aspect of the law of slander, is not concerned with
relationships among persons. It relates to legal proceedings in open court. The
special relationship of lawyer and client is not involved as it is, ofcourse, when one
is considering the law of negligence" ; ibid . , at pp . 695-696.
as P.C . Heerey, Rondel v. Worsley: The Australian Viewpoint (1968), 42
A.L .J . 3, at pp . 6-7 .
39 M. Catzman, supra .
40Supra, footnote 12, at p . 746, per Lord Denning M.R . In his recent book,
Lord Denning reaffirms his belief in the need for a broad immunity to be bestowed on




"between the dates of the decision in Leslie v . Ball (1863) and
Rondel v . Worsley (1967), the immunity of counsel was not
recognised in Ontario and negligence actions against lawyers respect-
ing their conduct of court cases did not attain serious proportions" .41
Also, while no immunity exists in the United States," there seems to
be no reported cases in which an advocate has been successfully sued
for his negligent conduct in court . Furthermore, while the prospect
of re-litigating an action is not an attractive one, it is not, as Krever
J . states, "a contingency that does not already exist in our law and
[is] inherently involved in the concept of res judicata in the
recognition that a party, in an action in personam is only precluded
from litigating the same matter against a person who was a party to
the earlier action' 1 .43
A third point is that it is highly unlikely that the quality of a
lawyer's work would, in fact, deteriorate simply because of the
possibility of his liability in negligence . The courts have not seen fit
to extend such an immunity to other professions, such as surgeons44
and architects, 45 who manage to carry out work of an equally vital
nature to the community and to comply with exacting professional
standards . Indeed, it can be forcefully argued that the threat of
litigation will provide an extra incentive to improve the quality of
work . As Dr. Johnson dryly observed: "Depend on it, Sir, when a
man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind
wonderfully . 1146
Fourthly, the alleged reasons given for the existence of an
immunity disregard the reality of insurance which now underlies the
modern operation of the law of negligence . Accordingly, the
the minority . "In Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell, a new set of Law Lords disagreed with
their predecessors . They restricted the immunity greatly. It was by a narrow majority
of 3 to 2. They confined the immunity virtually to the actual conduct of a case in
Court. Lord Keith of Kinkel, in a persuasive dissent, thought this went `some length
towards defeating the purpose of the immunity' and the considerations of public
interest on which it was based.", The Discipline of Law (1979), p. 250.
41 Supra, footnote 19, at p. 694 .
"In short, "an attorney must exercise reasonable care, skill and knowledge in
the conduct of litigation and must be properly diligent in the prosecution of the
case"; see 7 C.J .S ., pp . 982-984. See also, Wade, The Attorney's Liability for
Negligence (1959), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755; Gillen, Legal Malpractise (1973), 12
Washb. L.J . 281; and Haughy, Lawyers' Malpractice (1973), 48 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 888 .
as Supra, footnote 19, at p. 694. See also, Wade v. Ball, supra, footnote 25, at
p. 304, per Magarty C.J .
"Wilson v . Swanson, [19561 S .C .R . 804 and Ostrowski v. Lotto, [19731
S.C.R . 220.
"Dabous v . Zuliani et al . (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 230, 68 D.L.R . (3d) 414
(C.A .) .
°s Boswell's Life of Johnson (1792), vol iii, p. 167 .
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suggested advantages to be gained from immunity are completely
disproportionate to the potential loss suffered by the client,
especially when the ease, availability, relative cheapness and tax
deductibility of insurance is taken into account . Moreover, insurance
reduces the pressure on the lawyer, which seems to trouble a number
of judges, yet would not leave the dissatisfied client without a
remedy . In fact, all Ontario lawyers are required to have professional
liability insurance which would amply cover the negligent handling
of a case in court.47
Fifthly, without such immunity, it would be entirely erroneous
to imagine the lawyer as vulnerable and exposed, without any
defence against the disgruntled client . The advocate would not be
liable for the smallest mistake or error of judgment . His conduct
would not be adjudged against some absolute standard, but would be
measured against that of a prudent and ordinarily competent lawyer,
following the customary practise adopted by the profession." This
notion was correctly articulated by Lord Diplock :`
Those who hold themselves out as qualified to practise . . ., although they are
not liable for damage caused by what in the event turns out to have been an
error of judgment on some matter upon which the opinions of reasonably
informed and competent members of the profession might have differed, are
nevertheless liable for damage caused by their advice, acts or omissions in the
course of their professional work which no member of the profession who was
reasonably well-informed and competent would have given or done or omitted
to do .
Finally, the reliance on the fact that a lawyer is obliged to accept
any client is unwarranted for, whatever its significance in English
criminal law, it forms no part of the practise of civil litigation in
Ontario . Furthermore, Lord Diplock in SaifAli was not persuaded by
the force or validity of such a supporting ground . s o
When all these considerations and concerns are weighed
together, it is submitted that the advantages and benefits accruing
from the existence of an immunity are insufficient to balance the
hardship and injustice that the client would have to suffer . In effect,
the client has to bear the whole cost of a state of affairs that was no
fault of his own. Furthermore, the reputation of the whole legal
system is tarnished and respect for that system is unwarrantedly
endangered . Despite fervent claims to the contrary, the immunity
" At a present premium of $450.00 a year, an Ontario lawyer receives cover up
to $100,000 .00 for "any act or omission . . . arising out of the performance of
professional services . . . as a lawyer" .
4BAaroe v . Seymour . [19561 O.R . 736 (C.A .) andHauck v . Dixon etal . (1975),
10 O.R . (2d) 605 . See A . Linden, Canadian Negligence Law (1972), pp . 108-112.
11Supra, footnote 12, at p . 1041, per Lord Diplock .




appears to be nothing more than the Bench granting a special status
and privilege, not to be enjoyed by others, to an emanation of its
own. 51 Consequently, the decision of Mr. Justice Krever in the
Demarco case is to be applauded and commended for its good sense
and wise appreciation of the contemporary dictates of public policy .
Finally, it would seem appropriate to consider briefly the
implications of a lawyer being found civilly liable for the negligent
handling of a criminal case . Although there already exist provisions
whereby the issue of the lawyer's incompetence can be raised as a
ground of appeal", the Canadian courts have taken an unduly
formalistic approach to the problem and have been extremely
reluctant to rely on the ineffective performance of counsel as
forming a cogent reason for a successful appea153. While the courts
have been rightly concerned to guard against encouraging the
unscrupulous defence counsel, 54 their restrictive attitude has caused
them to give insufficient effect to other equally valid policy
considerations ." Nevertheless, the attempt to utilise the decision of
a civil court on the negligence of counsel as a possible ground of
appeal runs across problems of a slightly different nature . Firstly, the
fact that a decision in a civil action will often not be given until
several years after the criminal case in question presents an obvious
difficulty in that the sentence given may have been completed.
Secondly, a decision in a civil case cannot be admitted in a criminal
case as proof of the facts relied on therein. Accordingly, if the
convicted person is still completing his sentence, then, it is
suggested that a civil finding of incompetence should be sufficient to
warrant leave to appeal being granted under section 607 of the
Criminal Code"regarding application for appeal out of time, or that
such a finding wouldrepresent appropriate grounds forareference to
the Court of, Appeal by the Attorney General under section 605 of
the Criminal Code.
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
51 F. James, The Law of Torts (1956), p. 32 .
52 There is no special procedure, but the ordinary process of appeal from
conviction or a sentence can be utilised .
s3 For a survey of the approach of Canadian case law to the problem, see Asher
D. Grunis, Incompetence of Defence Counsel in Criminal Cases (1973-74), 16 Crim .
L.Q . 288.
54 It is conceivable that defence counsel might deliberately neglect a weak case
in order to secure a quashing of conviction by raising his own incompetence on
appeal or he might omit relatively important evidence, use this as a ground of appeal
and have a second chance at obtaining an acquittal before the appeal court; see
People v . Mitchell (1952), 104N.E . 2d 285 andR . v. Cutter, [194412 All E.R . 337 .
55 See, generally, P.M . North, Rondel v . Worsley and Criminal Proceedings,
[1968] Crim . L . Rev. 183 .
5s R.S.C ., 1970, c. C-34, as am .
Allan C . Hutchinson, of Osgoode Hall Law Schôol, York University,
Toronto .
